This paper is the first one that uses a panel data of different types of shareholder protection in order to examine (i) the effect of such laws on stock market development and (ii) the convergence of shareholder protection laws through cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
Introduction
A central idea in corporate finance is the principal-agent problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control of the corporation. Legal rules play a vital role in mitigating the principal agency problem by restraining managerial opportunisms. This suggests that laws protecting shareholders play important role in stock market development.
La Porta et al (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) confirm this relationship based on crosssectional studies of general aggregates quantifying shareholder protection. However, there have also been concerns about the accuracy of these legal data (Spamann, 2010) ; thus, the following is based on a more advanced index of shareholder protection, developed by the Centre of Business Research (CBR) at the University of Cambridge and available as panel data (Armour et al., 2009; Deakin et al., 2017) . Using this data, a prior study found a more pronounced rise in paternalistic than enabling rules on shareholder protection since 1990 (Katelouzou and Siems, 2015) . This paper is the first one to econometrically assess the possible relevance of these two type of rules.
Shareholder protection and stock market development
The CBR shareholder protection data are available for 30 countries over the period 1990-2013. As shown in Table 1 , the following is based on the general aggregate of this index, the aforementioned sub-indices on paternalistic and enabling rules, and a number of control variables.
------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here Table 2 reports the base-line result on the relationship between shareholder protection and stock market development estimation using the Arellano and Bond general method of moment estimator. We specify the model using Equation (1). where MGDP is market capitalization scaled by GDP, ∆ !"!! represents the instrumented electoral process change 1997-2012 (ELECPROCH) and !"!! represents the control variables following Pagano and Volpin (2008) . We report the results together with their standard errors in parentheses.

Insert Table 2 
Model 1, 2 and 3 are estimated with shareholder protection aggregate (SPI) aggregate, shareholder protection enabling (SPIE) and shareholder protection index paternalistic (SPIP) respectively as the main explanatory variables. The coefficient on our main variable of interest, SPI and SPIE display the expected signs and are statistically significant in Models 1 and 2 respectively. This suggests that SPI and SPIE improve stock market development. For instance, a point increase in SPI in Model 1 leads to an increase of 0.43% in stock market development: Additionally, a point increase in SPIE in Model 2 leads to an increase in stock market development by 1.44%. No such significant relationship is found for SPIP. Table 3 reports the results on the convergence of shareholder protection laws through cross-border mergers and acquisitions, estimated using an ordinary least square (OLS) estimator. We run the regressions using the following general specification (2).
Convergence of shareholder protection laws
∆ is the change in shareholder protection from 1990 to 2013. One at a time, of country j at time t. !" is a vector of estimates of SPI_97, SPIE_97, SPIP_97 and SPI regressed one at a time. !" is a vector of the control variables of country at time .
Throughout the analysis, we estimate all coefficients based on double-clustered standard errors, the clustering is done at the country and year level (Petersen, 2009 ). Our main variables of interest are cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA) and the interaction term of CBMA and shareholder protection index in 1997 (CBMA*SPI_97).
Insert Table 3 about here
The results show that CBMA positively influences shareholder protection.
Interestingly, the coefficient on CBMA is only significant for aggregate shareholder protection when an interaction term of CBMA and SPI_1997 is included in the estimation model. On the other hand, the coefficient on CBMA for SPIE increases in magnitude and significance if the interaction term CBMA and shareholder protection in 1997 is included. The positive relationship confirms our hypothesis on convergence by law through convergence by contract and is consistent with the findings of Pagano and Volpin (2006) . The result also indicates that the initial level of shareholder protection is significant through its interaction with CBMA. The coefficient on the interaction between CBMA and initial shareholder protection index in 1997 however, shows a negative relationship with SPI index in 2012.
We also measure the relationship between initial shareholder protection index in 1997 and shareholder protection in 2012. The result shows a negative relationship between initial shareholder protection (SPI_97) and current shareholder protection index (2012). These results are also statistically significant at the 1% level for all SPI measures and are robust to
the inclusion of the proportionality of the electoral system and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The results indicate that our sample countries have relatively improved on shareholder protection laws over the study period.
Conclusion
Our findings shed new light on the law and finance relationship as well as on the issue of international and club convergence in shareholder protection. Using a panel data for 30
countries over the period 1990-2013, shareholder protection is found to be significant for both questions. However, the distinction between enabling and paternalistic rules then shows that this is mainly due to the enabling rules of shareholder protection. This finding is remarkable as lawmakers have focussed more on increasing paternalistic rules (see 1., above); it also follows that the existing literature misses this core distinction in the relationship between law and finance.
6 (1). In each specification, the dependent variable is market capitalization scaled by GDP. The explanatory variables of key interest are SPI, SPIE and SPIP as defined in Table 1 . We define all other control variables in the notes to Table 1 . For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels respectively. Notes: Dependent variable is change in shareholder protection from 1990-2013. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double-clustered standard errors (clustering is done at the country and year level). For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels respectively.
